Abstract-We present a reliability study on a new low voltage power supply design for the front-end electronics of the ATLAS
I. INTRODUCTION
A new switching power supply has been designed for use in the front-end electronics of the Atlas Tile Calorimeter (TileCal) [1] for the ATLAS experiment [2] at CERN. The new supply is a drop-in replacement for the previous version that was installed on the detector in 2007. A power supply for this application consists of eight different bricks, which together provide power to the front-end electronics in a module of the Tile Calorimeter detector. Each of the eight bricks provides power to a different set of sub-circuits in the detector module. The supplies must function in a radiation environment and in a magnetic field. There are 256 modules in the detector, or a total of 2048 bricks on the detector. All units will be replaced in 2013. A description of the redesign project is given in [3] [4] . A picture of a power supply is shown in Fig. 1 . A picture of a new brick is shown in Fig. 2 .
The original power supply bricks for the detector, V6.5.4, have been operating on the detector since the start of the LHC operations, approximately 5 years. Generally, the supplies have functioned well, meeting the challenging requirements to function in the LHC environment. However, part of the motivation for the redesign project was a relatively high failure rate of the bricks during the fust two years of operation, of order 6 per year. The power system does not have redundancy, and the power supplies represent a single point failure in the readout system. Since there is no access to the front-end electronics during the year-long running periods, a failure of a single brick within a power supply causes an entire module of the detector to be lost for data taking, possibly for many months. Also, the new supplies must operate on the detector for the next lO years, until the next major upgrade of the experiment. These factors illustrate the importance of reliability for this system. In this note, we present a reliability and lifetime analysis for the new bricks. This was not an integral part of the design process of the original bricks. When the redesign project was started in 2009, the goal was to produce a drop-in replacement 978-1-4673-2030-6/12/$3l.00 ©20 12 IEEEthat addressed the reliability problems as they were understood at the time. We did not have the freedom to change the architecture of the power distribution system, nor were we able to change the physical footprint or the packaging. We endeavored to use as many of the same parts as possible, since they had already been qualified as radiation-tolerant. We also attempted to address one of the key reliability issues related to the use of tantalum capacitors, which we discuss below. A key aspect of this project is that design changes could not . be made within the constraints outlined above (such as addmg redundancy, using different capacitors, or radically changing the parts.) We will identify these aspects in the following analyses and conclusions.
Our approach in this analysis and a goal of this paper is to illustrate the techniques that we have employed in thinking about the reliability of an electronic circuit. We have not done a rigorous analysis using sophisticated software packages. Instead, we have approached this problem at a very basic level, to develop an intuitive feel for how reliability calculations work, what factors influence reliability, and also how to incorporate actual performance experience from an existing large system. As will be shown, often there is one or a few components in a design that are the weakest in tenns of reliability. Being able to identify these and mitigate their impact can make substantial improvements in the reliability of a system.
There are several benefits to this type of analysis. The first is to increase the awareness on the part of the designer of reliability of components used in a design, as part of component selection. This requires research to find the failure data for individual components, which is not always readily available for commercial parts. Generally there is a trade-off between high-reliability parts (i.e. for space and military applications), and cost, which makes this a significant factor in the initial selection of components for a particular application. The second benefit is to give the experiment a prediction or indicator of what failure rate to expect on the detector. This will assist with planning for spares, as well as the resources that might be needed during the shutdown periods to service the detector. Third, we as designers hope to assess our design choices by comparing the theoretical failure rate with the actual rate that will be measured in the coming years. This will assist with the design of future front-end systems. As will be shown, there is much that can be learned from critical evaluation of the performance of an existing system. This note is organized as follows: In Section II we present an overview of the circuit design and operation. In Section III the tenns and quantities are defined for the reliability calculations and analyses that follow. In Section IV we present a series of calculations that illustrate the analysis techniques, highlighting the important components in the circuit and describing in particular certain aspects of capacitors that need to be considered in the design process. We present a statistical analysis on the measured data from the old bricks and compute a correction factor for the prediction for the new bricks. Finally, we offer conclusions in Section V.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CIRCUIT
The basic topology of the brick is a transformer-coupled buck converter. Each brick receives 200 VDC at low current, and converts it using switching techniques to low voltage at moderate currents. A block diagram of the new power supply brick is shown in Fig. 3 .
The heart of the design is the LT1681 controller chip [5] . It is a pulse width modulator (PWM) that operates at a frequency of 300 kHz. The output duty factor can vary from a few percent up to a maximum of 45%. The pulse width is controlled by two inputs: the slow feedback path, which monitors the feedback voltage with a bandwidth of � 1 kHz, and a fast feedback path that monitors the current through the low-side transistor on the primary side. Both feedback paths must be designed properly to ensure continuous-mode operation at the nominal voltages and currents for each brick type.
The LT1681 provides an output clock to the FET drivers, IR2110 [6] . These are transistor drivers that have sufficient current and voltage output capability to drive the high-side and low-side power Field Effect Transistors (FETs), which perform the switching on the primary side. The design uses synchronous switching, i.e. both the high-side and low-side transistors turn on and conduct for the duration that the output clock is in the high state, and both are in the off state when the clock is low. When the FETs conduct, current flows through the primary windings of the trans fonner, which transfers energy to the secondary windings. The transfonner is a custom planar design, with turns-ratios of 14: 1 and 14:3 for the 5V and 15V transformers respectively.
The buck converter is implemented on the secondary side of the transformer. The output side also contains an additional LC stage for noise filtering. Voltage feedback for controlling the output voltage is provided by the A vago opto-isolators HCPL-7800 [7] . The design also incorporates a shunt resistor for measuring the output current, the voltage for which is fed back using an opto-isolator. The secondary side is completely floating with respect to the primary side, to facilitate grounding isolation of the front-end electronics with respect to the primary side of the power distribution system.
The value of the output voltage is controlled by a reference voltage that comes from the central controller in the L VPS box. The feedback circuit uses LM6142 operational amplifiers [8] . The brick has three types of protection circuitry built in as part of the design. There is over-voltage protection (OYP) and over-current protection (OCP). Both of these circuits are on the primary side, and both are configured for each particular type of bricks. Generally, the OYP circuits are set at 10-20% above nominal voltage, while the OCP circuits are set at 25-50% above nominal current. The controller has a soft start feature that limits the in-rush current for cold-starts. The brick design also incorporates over-temperature protection, which monitors the temperature of the primary side switching transistors. Lastly, the brick has monitor circuits. These send facsimile analog voltages to the central controller in the supply that represent the input and output voltage, the input and output current, and readings from two temperatures located on the brick.
For the purposes of calculating reliability, it is assumed that a failure of any of the primary components used in the buck converter portion of the circuit will result in a catastrophic failure. For the OYP and OCP circuits, only those component failures that can cause a catastrophic failure will be considered. The monitor circuits are generally benign to the overall reliability of the supply with respect to catastrophic failure, and will be excluded from the analysis.
III. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
(The interested reader may refer to [9] for an excellent introduction to reliability engineering.)
A. Hazard Rate A.(t)
The hazard rate is defined as the instantaneous probability of the first and only failure of a part or component. It is also referred to as failure rate, or failure intensity. Usually the hazard rate is not constant but varies over the life cycle of the system. A typical characterization of the time variation of failure intensity is the bathtub curve, as shown in Fig. 4 . The curve has three regions: infant mortality, in which a component fails early in its life generally due to manufacturing defects; useful life, where failures occur randomly in time with some average rate; and end of life, when a component wears out. During the useful lifetime of a device, the failure rate is a constant value, given by the total number of failures in a device population divided by the total time expended by that population. For the purposes of this analysis, we are only interested in the period of normal operation.
B. Failures in Time (FITS)
This is the failure rate quoted in reliability data sheets, expressed as the number of failures per one billion device hours of operation. It is generally obtained by observing the number of failures in a known sample size of devices for a certain amount of time at a stress temperature, and using the Arrhenius equation to estimate the number of failures that can be expected in one billion device hours of operation at an operational temperature, voltage, and current. 
C. Probability a/Failure Q(t)
This is the probability that the device will fail at or before time t. It is the cumulative distribution function of the time of operation of device until failure. For an exponential distribution of the time between failures, applicable during the useful life region of the bathtub curve, where failures occur randomly at a constant rate A, it is given by:
(1)
D. Probability of Failure-Free Operation R(t)
Also referred to as the reliability function, this is the probability that a device will not fail at or before time t. For an exponential distribution of time between failures, R(t) is given by:
The failure density is the probability density function of the time of operation of a device up to its failure. For an exponential distribution of the time between failures, a(t) is given by:
This is the average elapsed time for a part or component to fail for the first time. The term asswnes that the part or component is not repaired. Parts are generally characterized in terms of MTTF.
G. Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
For systems that are repairable, the concept of MTBF is used. Generally, this is the expected elapsed time between failures of a device during its operation. If the probability distribution of the time between failures is an exponential distribution characterized by a constant failure rate A, then the probability of failure is Poisson-distributed. The MTBF is then the reciprocal of A. Note that the MTBF of a device is not to be interpreted as its useful lifetime. The probability that a device will not fail until its MTBF is only 37%. A device population with a failure rate of A per unit time (i.e., MTBF of lIA) implies that, during their useful lifetime, a fraction A of the devices may be expected to fail per unit time.
IV. RELIABILITY ANALYSTS

A. Preliminary Analysis
We begin the analysis with a simplified circuit, as shown in Fig. 5 . It contains most of the critical components in the brick. Note that this is not a functional circuit, but is sufficient for the purposes of reliability calculations. The reliability data for the relevant components are listed in Table I , along with the FITS information from the manufacturer's data sheets and private communications [lO-16] . Note that these are the same parts used in the original version of the brick, V6.5.4, except for the tantalum capacitor. A signal flow drawing for the simplified circuit is shown in Fig. 6 . We assume that any failure of the components shown will open the signal flow loop and cause a failure.
The analyses that follow assume that the bricks are in the normal operating portion of the lifetime curve, where components exhibit a constant failure rate as a function of time (i.e. operation after the infant mortality period but before the end-of-life period). The failure data used in the calculations are taken directly from the manufacturers' reliability data sheet for each of the components under consideration. Since the transformer is a custom-made part in the circuit, it is assumed to be robust and is not included in the computation of the overall failure rate of the system (there have been no failures of transformers to date). For this part of the study, every component in the circuit has only two statesworking or failed. The system is asswned to have no relevant redundancies and is treated as a series system, where failure of one component results in failure of the circuit or system. The failure rate for the system is therefore considered to be equal to the product of the individual failure rates of the components. The analysis uses the following relationships: The FITS data for each component is obtained from the reliability datasheet. The failure rate of the system is the sum of the failure rates of its components, and the MTTF of the system is the reciprocal of its failure rate. Table I shows the result of this calculation. The MTTF for a single brick is found to be 284.41 years. For a population of 2048 bricks, this gives an estimated failure rate per year of :
Est. Failure Rate = 2048/284 .41 = �7 bricks / year (4) Using the calculation from Table I , the probabilities of failure-free operation R(t) for a single brick for time periods of 2, 5, 10 and 20 years are shown in Table II . As can be seen from Table I , the component with the lowest reliability is the tantalum capacitor, and this component dominates the lifetime prediction and the failure rate. We will discuss this further in the next sections. 
B. Reliability Issues with Tantalum Capacitors
As described in the previous section, the tantalum capacitor is the weakest component in the circuit in terms of reliability. The situation with the tantalum capacitors is complex, and has two additional considerations that affect reliability and lifetime. The fIrst is the nature of how these capacitors fail. In general, an electronic component may fail either as an open circuit or as a short circuit. The intermediate case where the component continues to operate but at signifIcantly different performance is not considered here. The nature of how a component fails depends on the construction of the component. How a particular failure mode affects the circuit performance depends on the details of the design. In general, reliability in system design makes use of parallel components when the failure mode is an open circuit, and series components when the failure mode is a short circuit.
In the simple circuit of Fig. 5 , only one capacitor was considered. Since this component is crucial for the operation of the buck converter, we did not make a distinction whether or not the capacitor failed as an open circuit or as a short circuit -either failure would cause a catastrophic failure in the operation of the brick.
However, in this design, large capacitor values are required for the operation of the buck converter and the actual circuit uses four capacitors in parallel in order to achieve the needed value of capacitance, as shown in Fig. 7 . When there are several capacitors in parallel, how they fail is important. If a single capacitor fails as an open circuit, the performance of the circuit may be reduced but the circuit may not fail catastrophically. However, if a single capacitor fails as a short circuit, then having multiple capacitors in parallel does not help. Generally, tantalum capacitors fail most of the time as short circu its (often in a most spectacular fashion!) and sometimes, as open circuits. For the analysis that follows, we use all of the same assumptions as in the previous section, but we add a weighting function to the capacitor failure rate. Using the FITS data, when a tantalwn capacitor fails, we will asswne that 114 of the time it fails as an open circuit, while 3/4 of the time it fails as a short circuit. This assumption is based on our operational experience with other large instrumentation systems, but the method illustrated below can be used with other models.
To see how this aspect affects the reliability of the circuit, we compare the probability of failure-free operation of the circuit for 2 years under two different scenarios. Using the FITS data from Table I , for the case where there is a single tantalwn capacitor and any type of failure is regarded as a catastrophic failure, the probability of failure-free operation of the circuit for 2 years can be written as: The probabilities of failure-free operation of the system for time periods of 2, 5, lO and 20 years using this model are shown in Table III . As can be seen, the probability of failure free operation is degraded by these assumptions.
The second consideration for tantalum capacitors is the voltage rating. The FITS data for capacitors as supplied by the manufacturer assume operation at the rated voltage. It is known that the lifetime of tantalum capacitors depends dramatically on the operating voltage and temperature [17] [18] . From [17] , the dependence on the hazard rate is given by: (7) where Ao is the nominal failure rate, nand F are factors that depend on capacitor type, T is the working temperature, To is the maximwn working temperature, V is the working voltage, and Vo is the maximum working voltage. For tantalum capacitors, n is found to be 3. As indicated, choosing a tantalum capacitor with a higher voltage rating and operating it at a voltage below the voltage rating will substantially decrease the failure rate. In the original design, many of the tantalum capacitors were operated very close to their maximum rating (15V operation, 20V rating.) In the new design, we chose tantalum capacitors with a rating of 35V for 15V operation. This gives a de-rating factor of (15/35i to the FITS value of 288 that was used earlier. The probabilities of failure-free operation of the circuit with four tantalum capacitors, after accounting for capacitor voltage de-rating, are shown in Table IV . As shown in Fig. 3 , there is an additional filtering section on the output, which uses a parallel combination of tantalum capacitors, along with an inductor. We now include them in the calculations, along with the two diodes on the secondary side (FITS value of 1 Ix 10-9 / hr). The circuit is shown in Fig.   8 . Including all of the considerations developed in Section B, the MTTF for a brick is now found to be 406.92 years. The probabilities of failure-free operation of this configuration are shown in Table V 
D. Comparison with the Original Brick
Since we have �3 years of experience with the original version of the bricks on the detector, V6.5.4, it is useful to perform a simple reliability analysis on this design using the techniques described above, and to compare it with actual experience. As we did in the previous section, we identify the critical components, and include the configuration of the tantalum capacitors that were used in the design. The model is shown in Fig. 9 . One key difference compared to the new design is that the capacitors have a voltage rating of 20V, and operate at 15V. Using the techniques developed previously, we perform the analysis below.
Given operation at 15V, this gives a de-rating factor of (15/20i to the FITS value of 288 that was used earlier.
Including all of the considerations developed in Section B, the MTTF for the original brick is found to be 165.17 years. The probabilities of failure-free operation are shown in Table VI .
For a population of 2048 bricks, this gives an estimated failure rate per year of :
Est. Failure Rate = 2048/165.17 = �12 bricks/ year (10) This is larger than the failure rate seen in the system during the first two years of operation, where �4 failures per year were observed. In the next section, we consider a correction to the above calculations based on measured performance. 
E. Statistical Analysis on V6.5.4 Bricks
Since we have 3 years of data with the V6.5.4 bricks, we can compare the failures observed in the experiment with the predicted numbers, to evaluate of the ability to predict failures using this technique. A summary of observed fatal failures over this period is given in Table VII. In the analysis that follows, the prediction of failures developed in Section D above is compared with the observed failure rate. Note that each year of operation is typically lO months of actual operation. The accuracy of the measured failure rate is determined by the total amount of failure instances, 13 for this sample. For the case of Poisson distributed n, the upper and lower limits on the mean value v can be found from the Neyman procedure [19] .
(11) (12) where the upper and lower limits are at confidence levels of l-alo and l-aup, respectively. The function F-, i is the
quantile of the X2 distribution or the inverse of the cumulative distribution. For central confidence intervals at confidence level I-a, one needs to set alo = aup = al2. For instance, for the 1 cr (or 68%) central confidence interval alo = aup = 0.159. This will lead to an asymmetric error bar.
The function F-2 1 can be computed using ROOT [20] .
A:'
Based on the failures reported in Table VII and assuming lO month operational periods, the measured failure rate is 5.2�::
per year. The error bars reflect 68.3% central confidence intervals, as calculated with 13 events. Using the same technique, one can evaluate the compatibility of the prediction with the measurement. At this stage the systematic error on the prediction is unknown. Therefore, the compatibility of the measurement and the prediction is evaluated as the probability of 5.2 to fluctuate into 12 given the fact that the former estimate is calculated with 13 events. Following the Neyman procedure one gets �'P = 0.0004, which corresponds to greater than 3.5cr. With this one can conclude that the measurement and the prediction are not compatible. Based on this, we assume that the above estimates for failure rates are high, and introduce an ad-hoc scale factor :
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12.4 -0 . 11 (13) As stated earlier, the errors on the � correspond to 68.3%
central confidence intervals and are driven by the accuracy of the fatal rate measurement.
F. Correction to Failure Predictions of the New Bricks
It is proposed that the ad-hoc scale factor in (13) be applied on the prediction for failure rates of the new electronics. Then, using the result from (13), we get a failure rate prediction for the new bricks as:
Est. Failure Rate = [2048 * r;j / 406.92
The errors in (13) can be viewed as a lower bound on the uncertainty of the prediction, as it does not reflect the uncertainty of the prediction per se. That said, the prediction multiplied by the ad-hoc factor is believed to be a better representation of the fatal failure rate.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A simple reliability study was done on the low voltage power supply design for the ATLAS Tile Calorimeter using the reliability data available from the manufacturers of the critical components of the circuit. Progressing through a series of simple analyses, we identified the tantalum capacitors used in the design as the weakest part. We used the fact that the capacitor lifetime can be extended by operating below the rated value, and observed the improvement in the reliability calculations by taking this into account. This improvement was especially prominent when comparing to the original design where far less headroom in operating voltage was used. Our calculations, even though they did not include all of the components in the circuit, are already more conservative than what was observed in the first 3 years of operation. By using Poisson statistics, we were able to calculate an ad hoc correction to the reliability prediction for the new design, since most of the parts used in the design were the same as the original, giving an estimated failure rate of 2 bricks per year.
Future work includes validation of these results both by looking into the test parameters and assumptions of the reliability data from component manufacturers, as well as comparing with the available failure data from the current operation of the bricks. A more thorough analysis of the current circuit, taking into account various failure modes for each of the components and also including more components in the circuit used for analysis will help in better estimating the expected number of failures per year. There are two clear observations from this study. The first is that the tantalum capacitors are the weakest part. Improvements for a future design might use more reliable capacitor such as an aluminum electrolytic, although generally the larger size of better capacitors can be a space issue (as it was in this design). Second, to achieve the best reliability, redundancy is probably needed. This comes at additional complexity and cost, and may have implications for packaging and space. As with any design, there are trade-offs, weighted by the needs and operational experience of the experiment.
This study emphasizes that reliability is important for all front-end systems in HEP detectors. For such systems, formal reliability analysis should be a part of the design process, and certainly included in the review process.
